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Re´sume´ / Abstract
This paper aims to test the effect of smallholder farmers’ participatory social
learning on their gain of performance in a village of southwest China. By explor-
ing a panel structure survey data collected in the village, we identify the social
learning effect using a Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) model. Particularly, we cal-
culate the technical efficiency and environmental efficiency from a SFA model and
use them as dependent variables of the model. Moreover, we investigate the social
learning of different technologies, i.e., conventional and organic farming, by sepa-
rating the estimations. Our identification results suggest that the effect of social
learning is weak due to the technological heterogeneity in the general case, whilst
it is significantly positive for organized organic farming. However, it appears that
farmers learn to improve their economic performance (i.e., maximize yield) rather
than environmental performance (i.e., minimize environmentally detrimental in-
put). These results reveal a critical limitation of social learning, and demand
more environmental orientation in the agricultural extension service, which is ex-
pected to guide smallholder farmers and foster their environmental performance
for sustainable agricultural development.
Mots cle´s / Keywords : Smallholder farming, Social learning, Organic farming,
Technical efficiency, Environmental efficiency, China.
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1 Introduction
Smallholder or family farming is the primary and most widespread form of agricultural pro-
duction in developing countries. It is estimated that 500 million rural people in developing
countries live on small farms (less than two hectares). The majority are undernourished
people living in absolute poverty (Hazell et al., 2007). According to FAO’s World Census
of Agriculture, there are 193 million small farms in China, which represent more than 95
per cent of total farms (Swaminathan, 2013; Be´lie`res et al., 2013). Given the special land
tenure regime, the average farm size in China is under 0.5 hectare (Fan and Chan-Kang,
2005)1.
This prevalent smallholder farming plays a critical role in the sustainable agricultural
development. From a sociological perspective, smallholder farming ensures the social
equity, poverty reduction and food security. It is essential for poor people with limited re-
sources and their substantial livelihood depends on these small pieces of land (Hazell and
Ramasamy, 1991; Greenland, 1997). From an economic perspective, smallholder farm-
ing may be more productive according to the studies supporting the inverse relationship
between farm size and productivity (Sen, 1962; Feder, 1985; Heltberg, 1998; Raghbendra
et al., 2000; Fan and Chan-Kang, 2005; Lipton, 2006). From an ecological perspective,
smallholder farming is natural resource and bio–diversity conserving, which makes it more
suitable and favorable for the development of environmentally sound and sustainable agri-
cultural technologies for our green future (Altieri, 2002).
However, smallholder farming is facing challenges in the context of economic global-
ization and transition. For instance, along with the development of manufacturing sector,
more and more smallholder farmers intend to move out of agriculture. In China, more
than 150 million farmers have moved out to work in the city (Cai and Wang, 2008;
NBSC, 2012). Meanwhile, accelerating urbanization and attractive investment opportu-
nities have opened up in agriculture, leading to large–scale investments and competition
for land, e.g., rubber plantations in Cambodia, palm oil production in Indonesia, real
1In China, the agricultural land is collectively owned. Under the Household Responsibility System
(HRS), rural households have right to exploit arable land for a long period of 30 years. The size of land
mainly depends on household size and composition.
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estate exploitation in China. Moreover, the soaring price of productive inputs, deteriora-
tion of agro–environment and threats of climate change make smallholder farming more
vulnerable.
In recent years, it is increasingly acknowledged that smallholder farming should be
revived in the development of sustainable agriculture. It is argued that smallholder farmers
who get involved in the management of social-ecological systems may learn and therefore
enhance their adaptive capacity through their involvement in decision making processes
(Folke et al., 2005; Fazey et al., 2007). This process is known as social learning. In
the influential work of Bandura (1977), social learning is defined as individual learning
based on observation of others and their social interactions within a group, e.g. through
imitation of role models. Supported by the social learning theory, a number of farmer
participatory development approaches have been put forward to get smallholder farmers
involved in the sustainable agriculture in developing countries (Pretty, 1995; Desai and
Potter, 2013). The raising literature of social learning and participatory development
has critical implication for ongoing sustainable agriculture development, yet the empirical
test of social learning remains rare. To our knowledge, few empirical study of the social
learning exists in China.
To fill in this blank, this paper attempts to determine the effect of participatory social
learning on smallholder farmers’ economic and environmental performances in rural China.
We have identified the Sancha village in southwest China where farmer participatory
social learning was organized for organic paddy rice production. We conduct a household
survey in the village and collect a plot level panel dataset for the empirical analysis. In
terms of econometric methodology, we combine the Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) model
with peer effect analysis to estimate the social learning effect within carefully defined
learning group. Specifically, we purge confounding factors such as inputs contamination
(i.e., nitrogen fertilizer) by using the technical efficiency and environmental efficiency as
dependent variables of the model. With different efficiency terms, we test whether farmers
learn to maximize their output (technical efficiency), or to minimize their nitrogen use
(environmental efficiency). Finally, the estimation is applied within separated sub–samples
of conventional and organic farming to test the technological constraints of social learning.
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Our estimation results suggest that the effect of social learning is non significant among
smallholder farmers in general case. This is mainly due to the heterogeneity of technology
in smallholder system. In the case of organized organic farming, social learning is sig-
nificant in improving farmers’ technical efficiency, but not their environmental efficiency.
In other words, farmers learn to maximize their output rather than to minimize nitrogen
input. Based on these results, we conclude that social learning is effective in fostering
smallholder farmers’ performance for productive agriculture if it is well organized. How-
ever, for the goal of resource conservative agriculture, external supports such as extension
service and environmental education are needed to guide smallholder farmers.
For the remainder of the paper, Section 2 reviews the literature of social learning and
smallholder sustainable agriculture. Section 3 describes the organization of social learning
in the village. Section 4 explains the methodological framework of our analysis and the
identification strategy. Section 5 gives details about our data and Section 6 discusses the
main results. Section 7 provides policy implications and concludes.
2 A literature review of social learning and sustain-
able agricultural development
Environmentally–sound or ecological agriculture (e.g. organic farming, low-input agri-
culture and permaculture) has been promoted by governments and development agencies
for sake of sustainable agricultural development during past decades (FAO, 2002; IFAD,
2002; WorldBank, 2009; Twarog, 2006). In contrast to conventional agriculture, ecological
agriculture can generate outstanding environmental benefits and ecosystem services, e.g.
reduction of soil erosion and pollution, improvement of soil fertility and bio diversity, and
alleviation of dependence on chemical inputs (Swinton et al., 2007). Particularly, sustain-
able agriculture seems to be more profitable in developing countries given its features of
low external–input and increasing yield albeit original low level (Stoop et al., 2002; Pretty
et al., 2003).
A big challenge for development of the sustainable agriculture in developing countries
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remains to involve smallholder farmers. In response, new development initiatives such
as Participatory Research and Development (PRD) and the Farmer Field Schools (FFS)
have emerged to promote sustainable agriculture to smallholder farmers in developing
countries (Braun et al., 2000; Godtland et al., 2004; Feder et al., 2004). These initiatives
aim to introduce and adapt sustainable agriculture to local conditions by farmers’ partici-
patory field trial and then to diffuse successful experience through a social learning process
(Pretty, 1995; Pretty and Uphoff, 2002). A growing body of studies have emerged recently
to evaluate the impact of farmer participatory initiatives and understand the process of
social learning (Godtland et al., 2004; Feder et al., 2004; Van den Berg and Jiggins, 2007).
In economics, the literature of social network analysis has opened a new perspective
for more thorough understanding about farmers’ social learning process (Romer, 1986;
Lucas, 1988; Rogers, 1995). On the theory side, Besley and Case (1994) develop a dynamic
model of learning to study farmers’ adoption decision of new technology. In this model,
the uncertainty about the profitability is a major concern for farmers’ adoption of new
technology. In a Bayesian learning process, farmers can learn from their own experience as
well as others’ behavior about the true profitability and update their own behavior. In a
repeated equilibrium, interaction between farmers is necessary provided the information is
a public good. Using this model, one can predict the diffusion path of the new technology.
Alternatively, Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) adapt a “target-input” model to explain
farmers’ learning about the optimal use of inputs with a new technology(Wilson, 1975;
Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1994). In the setting of “target-input” model, the profitability of
new technology is increasing with the accumulation of knowledge observed from neighbors.
The accumulated knowledge allows farmers to learn about the target input rate or the
optimal input level to merit adoption. Therefore, they argue that learning about input
productivity is as important as profitability in the diffusion of new technology, while
identification of social learning using information of input productivity or its rewards is
more accurate than adoption behavior.
The “target-input” model is useful to explain the social learning based on “rule-of-
thumb” learning behavior (Conley and Christopher, 2001)2. In situations where agent
2The rule-of-thumb learning rules can be defined as follows: at each period, each agent constructs his
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cannot observe his neighbors’ experience perfectly, or where neighbors’ performance is es-
sentially determined by unobserved individual characteristics and conditions, social learn-
ing may be weak. In other words, agents learn from similar neighbors only (Ellison and
Fudenberg, 1993). In a more recent work, Young (2009) revises the existent models of
diffusion and makes a comprehensive comparison of the social learning model with the
contagion model in marketing (Mahajan et al., 1990) and the social influence model in
sociology (Granovetter, 1978).
In spite of the rich implications of social learning theory, the empirical identification of
social learning effect is not easy. In his seminar work on social interaction, Manski (1993)
uses the term of “reflection problem” to describe the difficulty of disentangling endogenous
social effect (e.g. social learning) from exogenous social effect (contextual effect) in a
linear-in-means model3. Subsequently by the discussions of Brock and Durlauf (2001)
and Moffitt (2001), social learning effect is often confounded with common environment
conditions or other group correlations that do not necessarily entail social learning. It
raises even more concerns in the agricultural context because agricultural production
generally depends on the common growing conditions.
To achieve convincing identification of social learning, one condition is to well define the
reference group within which the learning process takes place. Then, different strategies
can be employed to identify the social learning effect. Among others, Munshi (2004)
compares the social learning effect on adoption of different HYV crops (wheat and rice)
in the same district and finds that social learning is weak in a heterogeneous population.
Bandiera and Rasul (2006) assume the effect of correlated unobservable is monotonic and
test for non-linearities predicted by a model of strategic interactions in social learning. By
doing so, they find an inverse–U shape social learning effect which depends on the number
of adopters in the social network in Mozambique. Conley and Udry (2010) exploit the
timing of news about neighbors productivity to test for social learning effect in the fertilizer
use in Pineapple production in Ghana. They take special care in construction of reference
group and control for environmental factors and find a positive social learning.
posterior as a weighted average of his prior, his signal and the information he receives from neighbors.
3In the linear-in-means model, the outcome of each agent depends linearly on his own characteristics,
on its mean characteristics and on the mean outcome of his reference group.
8
Etudes et Documents n◦18, CERDI, 2013
However, most of empirical studies investigate the effect of social learning on the
adoption of new technology. Few has tested the social learning on the performance of
new technology (except for the study of (Conley and Udry, 2010)). To the best of our
knowledge, there is still no empirical evidence about social learning on the performance
of sustainable agriculture in developing countries. To fill in this blank, we follow the
literature of social network analysis and attempt to test the social learning effect on
smallholder farmers’ performance in the context of NRR in rural China. We will now
turn to this special case and discuss the organization of social learning in the Sancha
village.
3 The participatory social learning in Sancha village
Sancha (109.01E/22.73N) is a small natural village located in the mountainous zone of
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous region4. Thanks to the well preserved environment, Sancha
village was identified by a Hong Kong-based NGO, called Partnerships for Community
Development (PCD), for a project of organic paddy rice production within the framework
of “New Rural Reconstruction” in 2005. At the beginning, the organic rice production
was introduced to a small group of farmers in the form of field trials. The PCD, in
collaboration with the Guangxi Maize Research Institute (GMRI), had assisted farmers’
experiments of organic farming with technical guidance and marketing support. Through
these field trials, a number of local knowledge such as pest control with local medicinal
plants, composting and the “Duck-Rice” integrated system had been revived to adapt
organic farming to local conditions.
In order to diffuse the successful experience of organic farming and get more farmers
involved, the project opted for an approach of participatory social learning. According to
the investigation of PCD, the rice production was organized on basis of four families (i.e.
Li, Xu, Huang and Lu families) in Sancha village. The paddy fields were thus divided and
exploited by four families labelled production group 1, 2, 3 and 4. Specifically, each family
4 A“village” in China can either be a natural village (Zirancun), one that spontaneously and naturally
exists, or an administrative village (Xingzheng cun), which is a bureaucratic entity
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has 2 groups of paddy fields, one in the plain zone and another in the mountainous zone.
As such, 8 groups of paddy fields were naturally defined. Map 1 provides an overview
for the location of these groups. Nowadays under the Household Responsibility System
(HRS), collective farming system has been broken into individual production, whereas the
grouping of paddy fields remains unchanged.
Map 1. Groups of paddy fields in Sancha village
Source: Sancha village committee
The participatory social learning took place within these 8 groups for several reasons.
Firstly, farmers worked simultaneously in the group as paddy rice production is a seasonal
activity. They communicated during agricultural work to exchange information and ease
the work. Also, their coordination was frequent in the group due to their collective man-
agement of water resource. Secondly, provided the small size of paddy field, farmers could
directly observe the inputs and outputs of other farmers in the group, which favored the
learning process. Thirdly, farmers spoke the same language in the group, which was es-
sential for the social learning. With this understanding, workshops were organized within
10
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the group where all farmers of the group were united together to share their experience of
organic farming. Farmers could then learn from their peers to improve their management
of the technology or start their own experiment of organic farming. The learning is qual-
ified as a social process as it not only takes place within the workshops, but also extends
to farmers’ interaction during their daily production. It is expected that in a process of
social learning, farmers can generate their own knowledge and reduce the dependance on
external assistance.
In this study, we follow the PCD definition of learning group for an investigation of
social learning effect. Farmers’ learning peers are defined as all farmers of the same group
except for himself. We recognize the limitation of such a rough measure of social learn-
ing networks, for it cannot distinguish the specific links between agents (e.g. relatives
and friends). However, the definition takes account of all potential learning sources and
avoids measurement errors and omission of information in the learning process, which is
appropriate in a smallholder environment. With this definition of reference group, the
social learning effect could be captured by the peer effect of the group outcome on the
individual outcome (i.e. agricultural performance defined as yield, technical efficiency or
environmental efficiency). Still, the social learning effect can be confounded with other en-
vironmental factors. For instance, the inputs contamination or the agro–ecosystem could
also collectively affect farmers’ agricultural performance. Moreover, farmers’ agricultural
performance could depend on other social mechanisms such as altruism that do not neces-
sarily entail social learning. In the next section, we will present our identification strategy
to disentangle social learning from these confounding factors.
4 Identification of the social learning effect
As discussed in the literature review, estimating social learning effect raises three main
challenges. Firstly, Manski (1993) divided social effects into an endogenous part (i.e.
social learning effect) and an exogenous part (i.e., contextual influence). The separation
11
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of these two parts is a main challenge and thoroughly discussed as the reflection problem5.
Secondly, the problem of “correlated effects” will raise when social learning needs to be
identified from confounding environmental effects (i.e. factors related to common group
environment). Thirdly, spurious correlation among members of the same reference group
plague the identification if the formation of group is endogenous(Moffitt, 2001)6. These
challenges call for appropriate statistical methodology which differs from one study to
another. We will follow the literature to present our strategy addressing these challenges
in our specific setting.
4.1 The basic model
Our model is an extension of the standard linear-in-means social interaction model in
which we allow for plot–specific reference groups. Consider we have a set of plots i,
(i = 1, . . . n). Let yi,t be the agricultural outcome (e.g. yield) of plot i in season t.
Let Xi,t be a vector of plot owner’s characteristics. Each plot i may have a reference
group Pi of size ni. This reference group is known by the modeller and contains all plots
whose outcomes or owner characteristics may affect plot i’s outcome. The collection of
plot–specific reference groups thus defines an undirected network of plots7.
Consider the following spatial autoregressive regression (SAR) model extended to social
network economics (Brock and Durlauf, 2001) in which spatial units are plots and the peers
effects are either contextual or endogenous. Formally, the structural model is formulated
as:
yi,t = α + β
∑
j∈Pi
yj,t−1
ni
+ θyi,t−1 + γXi,t + δ
∑
j∈Pi
Xj,t
ni
+ τt + ǫi,t. (1)
Note here we use the lagged peers’ performance to avoid a potential simultaneity of out-
come and β captures the endogenous social effect (i.e. social learning effect)8. δ captures
5Manski (1993) has pointed out that the expected outcome from social equilibrium might be linearly
depended on observed exogenous variables of a group in the model, i.e., the reflection problem.
6Here is the case where members in a group share common characteristics which leads to self–selection
for the creation of the group.
7This corresponds to usual empirical formulation (e.g. Lee (2007)).
8Using the lagged performance of neighbors avoids the simultaneity problems since the current perfor-
mance of the plot i cannot explain the past performance of his peers. However, some correlated variables
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the contextual effect and γ captures the effects of plot owner’s characteristics (i.e. age,
gender and education level). Given the underlying social process, the lagged errors ǫi,t−1
are correlated with the lagged peers’ outcomes and if the errors are serially correlated, the
estimation of β is biased since the cov(ǫi,t,
∑
j∈Pi
yj,t−1
ni
) 6= 0. The addition of lagged indi-
vidual outcome yi,t−1 thus helps to control for this potential bias. The τt is a dummy fixing
five crop seasons in our data and the error term ǫi,t reflects the usual i.i.d. disturbances
with zero mean and an unknown variance associated with i.
To make it simpler, we can write the structural model in matrix notation.
yi,t = αι+ βGyj,t−1 + θyi,t−1 + γXi,t + δGXj,t + τt + ǫi,t, (2)
where y is an n× 1 vector of outcomes, G is an n× n interaction matrix with Gij = 1/ni
if j and i are in the same reference group, and 0 otherwise, and ι is an n × 1 vector of
ones. G derives from our definition of reference group on basis of the village’s social and
geographical structure: (1) four families and (2) geographical location (either on plain or
in mountain). Other socio-economic characteristics X which could influence the outcomes
include the owner’s age, gender and education level.
4.2 Identification strategy
The OLS estimation of equation 2 is naive since two types of spurious correlation within
the reference group may exist in our setting. The first type of correlation is specific to
the group environment. For instance, plots within the same group share the same water
source. The agricultural outcomes of each plot i are thus interdependent due to inputs
contamination (e.g. fertilizers). The second type of correlation is specific to individ-
ual characteristics. For instance, farmers of the same group may help each other which
depends on individual unobservable characteristics. To purge these spurious correlation
other than social learning, we employ a classical IV strategy and an alternative dependent
variable strategy.
explaining both the performance of the plot i in t and the group formation (and thus the performance of
the group in t− 1) may still present.
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An IV strategy The first strategy relies on the random shocks of rats and pests attacks
to the plots. In the context of smallholder farming, these ecological shocks cause significant
damages to the rice production. As observed in Sancha village, the attacks of rats and
pests are arbitrary in the time as well as in place. This observation leads to an assumption
that the ecological shocks to a plot will influence its outcomes (i.e. yield and efficiency)
but not that of its peers directly. On basis of this assumption, we can make use of peers’
ecological shocks (i.e. average attacks of rats and pests to peers’ plots) as instruments for
peers’ outcomes conditional on individual ecological shocks. The exclusion restriction of
instruments will be checked by the Sargan over-identification test.
Equation 2 is thus firstly estimated using the IV estimator while controlling for group
fixed effects ζG as follows:
yi,t = αι+ βGyj,t−1 + θyi,t−1 + γXi,t + δGXj,t + ζG + τt + ǫi,t, (3)
Still, the concern about the farmers’ altruism remains. Suppose farmers help each other
to mitigate the damages of ecological shocks, this altruism could improve the outcome of
the group as a whole. However, this collective improvement of outcome is not due to social
learning and thus bias the estimation. This source of bias is related to the unobservable
individual characteristics which could be controlled for in a Within model. Therefore,
to deal with individual specific correlation and validate the IV estimation, equation 2
is estimated using the Within-2SLS estimator and controlling for plot fixed effect νi as
follows:
yi,t = αι+ βGyj,t−1 + θyi,t−1 + γXi,t + δGXj,t + νi + τt + ǫi,t, (4)
The first step regression is as follows:
Gyj,t−1 = ρ1Gratsj,t−1 + ρ2Gpestsj,t−1 + ρ3θyi,t−1 + ρ4Xi,t + ρ5GXj,t + νi + τt + ξi,t, (5)
where ρ1 and ρ2 are the coefficients associated to the two instruments.
14
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Alternative measure of outcome The second strategy relies on the use of technical
efficiency (TE) and environmental efficiency (EE) as outcome measure. Here the TE
represents farmer’s managerial skill to maximize output at a given inputs level, whilst
the EE represents his managerial skill to minimize environmentally detrimental input at
a given output level. The use of efficiency term is of particular interest. Firstly, the
managerial skill is more relevant and accurate for the social learning process. Secondly,
the efficiency term is estimated from a production function. This process can purge
correlations of outcomes due to contamination of productive inputs, e.g. fertilizers used in
peers’ plots. Thirdly, using two measures of efficiency, we can derive precise understanding
about farmers willingness to learn with respect to economic performance and environment
protection.
In practice, the calculation of efficiency is made by a SFA approach(Guo and Marc-
hand, 2012)9. Here a farmer is assumed to use traditional inputs X and environmentally
detrimental inputs N to produce rice Y on his plot i . This can be written to represent
a particular technology: Yi = f(xi), where f(xi) is a production frontier. Under the hy-
pothesis of market imperfections, not all farmers are able to produce at the frontier. The
TE thus measure the distance of Yi from the frontier. Therefore, TE follows an output–
oriented measure of production inefficiency (more conventional output with the same set
of inputs). Precisely, we model the production frontier using a transcendental logarithmic
(“translog”) specification (Diewert, 1971) with three traditional inputs (labor, capital and
water) and one environmental detrimental input of pure nitrogen (N) as follows:
ln(Yi,t) = β0 +
3∑
j=1
βjln(Xij,t) + βzln(Ni,t) +
1
2
3∑
j=1
3∑
k=1
βjkln(Xji,t)ln(Xki,t)
+
1
2
3∑
j=1
βjzln(Xji,t)ln(Ni,t) +
1
2
βzzln(Ni,t)
2 − Ui,t + Vi,t,
(6)
where i = 1, . . . , n are the plots and t = 1, . . . , 5 are the number of seasons; j, k =
1, 2, . . . , 3 are the applied traditional inputs; ln(Yi,t) is the logarithm of the output of
9See Guo and Marchand (2012) in which the authors of this present study develop a stochastic pro-
duction frontier model to estimate both TE and EE. In this paper, the authors investigates the role of
organic farming on EE in the same case study than the one used in this present study.
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farmer i; ln(Xij,t) is the logarithm of the j
th traditional input applied by the ith indi-
vidual; ln(Ni,t) is the logarithm of the environmental detrimental input applied by the
ith individual; and βj, βz, βjk, βjz and βzz are parameters to be estimated
10. Ui,t are
non-negative unobservable random variables associated with TE that follows an arbitrary
distribution11. Vi,t represent random shocks which are assumed to be i.i.d errors with a
normal distribution of zero mean and unknown variance12.
On the other hand, EE is defined following Reinhard et al. (1999) as the ratio of
observed use of environmentally detrimental inputs (N) to the minimum feasibility, con-
ditional to identical output and conventional inputs. In this case, EE is an input–oriented
measure (less environmental detrimental input with the same output and conventional
inputs) formulated by the following non–radial input–oriented measure:
EEi,t(x, y) = [min θ : F (xi,t, θZi,t) ≥ yi,t], (7)
where the variable yi,t is the observed output for the plot i at season t, produced using xi
of the conventional inputs and Ni of the environmentally detrimental inputs. F (.) is the
best practise frontier with x and Z.
To save place, we do not develop the stochastic production frontier model here. A
complete model is presented in our previous paper Guo and Marchand (2012) and more
detailed calculation of EE can be found in Appendix A.
4.3 Technological heterogeneities
One important feature of smallholder farming is the technological heterogeneity. Specifi-
cally in our case, as farmers practice organic and conventional farming in the same group,
the heterogeneity of technology could plague farmers’ social learning and should be taken
10Similarity conditions are imposed, i.e., βjk = βkj . Moreover, the production frontier requires mono-
tonicity (first derivatives, i.e., elasticities between 0 and 1 with respect to all inputs) and concavity
(negative second derivatives). These assumptions should be checked a posteriori by using the estimated
parameters for each data point.
11This can be either a half-sided normal distribution or an exponential one.
12A stochastic production frontier implies that the error term has two components: random shocks Vi
(not attributed to the relationship between inputs and output) and an inefficiency term Ui (Aigner et al.,
1977; Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977).
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account in our analysis (Munshi, 2004). To this end, we divide our sample into two
sub–samples according to production technology (i.e. organic farming and conventional
farming) and identify the social learning effect within each sub-sample. The hypothe-
sis is that social learning is more likely to happen with a homogenous technology than
heterogenous technology.
This approach is useful to test the constraint of technological heterogeneity for social
learning. However, it also raises a self-selection problem. Put another way, conditions for
a farmer to practice organic farming may be different from his conventional counterpart.
Farmers may thus self-select to the organic farming. The artificial division of sample will
create biased estimation if the self-selection exists. To rule out this potential problem, we
implement a Heckman correction to the estimation (Maddala, 1983).
To do so, we estimate the probability of farmer to practice organic farming as follows:
Organici,t = γ0 + γ1Distancei,t + γ2Pollutioni,t + γ3yi,t−1 + γ4Xi,t + γ5GXj,t + τt + εi,t, (8)
where Organici,t is a dummy variable indicating the organic status of the plot i at season
t. The variables Distancei,t is the distance for the household to reach the plot from his
house. Pollution is a dummy variable coding 1 if the plot has at least one neighbor
using chemicals fertilizer. We assume that these two variables are exogenous factors that
determine farmer’s choice for organic farming (more discussion about these instruments is
found in our previous paper (Guo and Marchand, 2012)). yi,t−1 is the lagged performance
of plot i. X is a matrix of plot owner’s characteristics (i.e. age, gender and education
level) and GX is a matrix of the same characteristics at group level. τt is a dummy fixing
one of the five seasons. εi,t is the error term.
From equation 8, we calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio (λ) and use it as a new control
variable in the regression within each sub–sample, i.e., conventional and organic farming,
as follows:
yi,t = αι+ βGyj,t−1 + θyi,t−1 + γXi,t + δGXj,t + λi,t + τt + ǫi,t, (9)
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In equation 9, yi,t is the outcome of plot i in season t, i.e. the yield, the technical
efficiency and the environmental efficiency. The equation 9 is then estimated by the OLS
estimator, the 2SLS estimator and the Within-2SLS estimator.
5 Data and descriptive statistics
The data used for the empirical test of social learning is derived from a household survey
that we conducted in Sancha village in 2010. In collaboration with local agronomist of
PCD, we have inspected 108 households that effectively participate in paddy rice pro-
duction in the village. For each household, we inspected all of his paddy fields (both
conventional and organic) and randomly selected two plots for the survey13. With the
household head, we identified the selected plots and recorded information about the plot
location. We then asked household head to recall information for five agricultural sea-
sons from 2008 to 2010 with respect to organic practice, production techniques, output
and inputs on each of two plots14. Also, a number of household characteristics including
household head’s age, gender and education level were recorded. Table 1 gives descriptive
statistics of the main variables for this study and a summary of variable definitions can
be found in Table B1 in appendix.
13In principle, we selected one conventional plot and one organic plot for comparison. In case of non
conversion or total conversion, we selected two plots randomly.
14For more details, see our previous paper (Guo and Marchand, 2012)
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Rice yield(kg/mu) 342.12 94.59 43.75 750 1,007
Labor(person h/mu) 129.82 54.12 28.45 338.81 1,007
N(kg/mu) 14.13 3.97 4.98 34.5 1,007
Capital(Yuan/mu) 73.77 52.03 3.75 265 1,007
Water (1-3) 2.41 0.61 1 3 1,007
Technical efficiency (0-1) 0.73 0.12 0.33 0.98 1,007
Environmental efficiency (0-1) 0.45 0.19 0.08 0.96 1,007
Age 54.62 12.61 28 79 1,007
Sex (1 = female) 0.6 0.49 0 1 1,007
Education (0-12 years) 3.63 3.31 0 12 1,007
Organic (1 = organic) 0.34 0.47 0 1 1,007
Distance (categorical variable) 1.92 0.87 1 4 1,007
Chemical pollution(1 = yes) 0.74 0.44 0 1 1,007
Rats (0-2) 0.49 0.57 0 2 1,007
Insects (0-2) 1.00 0.69 0 2 1,007
Source: authors’ survey
From the descriptive statistics, we note that the rice production in Sancha village is
principally implemented on small pieces of land (0.03 ha). It is conducted by senior (55
years) and female (60 percent) farmers, which is in line with the reality of labor outflow in
the countryside. The large variation of inputs suggests that the production technology is
heterogenous. For instance, about 34% of surveyed fields are under organic management,
whilst 66% are under conventional farming. It is worth noting that most rice farmers have
suffered ecological shocks, i.e. the attacks of pests and rats. More than half of farmers have
reported to receive pests and rats attacks, so that the influence of ecological shocks should
not be ignored in our analysis. Finally, we also note that the mean technical efficiency is
higher (0.73) than the mean environmental efficiency (0.45) in the sample, which suggests
that farmers have greater economic performance than environmental performance. In the
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following analysis, we will explore the dataset to investigate whether smallholder farmers
could improve their performance in a social learning process and approve this participatory
approach for sustainable agricultural development.
6 Econometric results
In this section, we present the identification results of social learning effect as discussed
in previous section. A number of issues and policy implications raised by the results will
be discussed. First of all, we regress the individual rice yield on the group rice yield
to test the social learning effect as benchmark. To deal with potential group correlated
effects (e.g., environmental correlation) and individual correlated effects (e.g., altruism
effect), we implement Within and Within-2SLS estimation in addition to the naive OLS
estimation and make a step–by–step analysis (for completeness, see Table C1 in Appendix
C for first stage IV regressions). As one can note in Table 2, after correcting for group
and individual correlated effects (columns 3 and 4), we do detect a significantly negative
correlation of yields within the reference group, which however disappears in the Within-
2SLS estimation (columns 5).
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Table 2: Social learning effect and rice yield in the total sample
Dependent variable: agricultural yield
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged peers’ outcome 0.066 -.103 -.807∗∗∗ -.411∗∗ 0.324
(0.139) (0.128) (0.171) (0.16) (0.973)
Lagged individual outcome 0.625∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ -.283∗∗∗ -.298∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.039) (0.061) (0.081)
Age -.344 -.052 -.405 -405.360∗∗∗ -62.362
(0.548) (0.414) (0.505) (128.174) (451.420)
Sex -17.126 -15.395 -18.599
(14.682) (11.348) (14.557)
Education 1.324 0.037 1.231
(2.144) (1.742) (1.906)
Rat -13.410
(16.271)
Pests 1.571
(9.297)
Group age 7.606∗ 3.253 -3.664 416.210∗∗∗ 164.542
(4.223) (3.701) (6.208) (123.072) (364.204)
Group sex 36.031 43.313 -64.025 -1634.042 116.241
(66.600) (64.571) (242.264) (2155.999) (3115.265)
Group education -11.587 -7.286 -1.157 -9.679 -9.498
(7.048) (5.803) (7.925) (12.768) (12.262)
Intercept 229.770 101.094 1107.963∗∗ 1579.653
(271.292) (231.007) (527.650) (1724.860)
Control for Lagged performance x x x x
Group dummies x x x
Individual fixed effect x x
Instrumentation x
Observations 805 805 805 805 805
Number of plots 202 202 202 202 202
F statistic 6.526 38.1 38.201 24.86 13.275
R2 0.073 0.453 0.477 0.223 0.196
RMSE 183.149 140.774 138.331 97.915 114.443
Hansen statistics 1.583
P-value Hansen statistics 0.208
Estimation method: OLS estimator in columns 1 to 3, within estimator in column 4 and within-2SLS in column
5. The dependent variable is the yield defined as the raw rice output per land area. Seasons dummies are
controlled for in all regressions. Group fixed effects are controlled for in column 3 and plot fixed effects in
columns 4 and 5. The variables sex and education are time invariant and thus dropped in columns 4 and 5. ***
statistical significance at 1%, ** statistical significance at 5%, * statistical significance at 10%.
The non-robust negative correlation is obviously not due to social learning, but rather
due to contamination or spillover of inputs use (i.e. fertilizer and water). In fact, the
competition of conventional and organic plots exists in the mixed total sample. It is
plausible that the yield of organic plot could be negatively influenced by the overuse and
leaching of chemical fertilizers from neighbor conventional plots. In turn, the yield of
conventional plot is determined by chemical fertilizers which is constrained by neighbor
organic plots due to conflicts and social pressure. The complex correlations of yields make
it complicate to identify the social learning effect. To get rid of this concern, we now focus
on the technical efficiency and environmental efficiency which are more relevant to social
learning process.
Table 3 present the results when technical efficiency (columns 1 to 3) and environ-
mental efficiency (columns 4 to 6) are used to measure plot’s outcome. Columns 1 and
4 are estimated by simple OLS estimator. Columns 2 and 5 take care of environmental
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correlation by controlling for group dummies and applying the IV estimation. Columns 3
and 6 eliminate the altruism effect and give a causal effect of social learning by applying
Within-2SLS estimation15.
Note here in the case of technical efficiency, we detect a positive correlation among
farmers when using a naive OLS estimator. However, the correlation becomes non-
significant once confounding environmental factors and individual characteristics are con-
trolled for. This result suggests the importance of group and individual correlated effects
in our case, which need to be taken into account. Similarly in the case of environmental
efficiency, the correlation is positive but non-significant. In contrast, the lagged individual
performance is strongly significant, which suggests farmers’ performance rely on their own
experience, rather than others’ performance. One plausible explanation to the absence of
social learning effect is that in a heterogeneous population, it is difficult for farmers to
learn from peers with different technology (Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993). The mixture
of technology in total sample may thus plague the social learning process. To test this
hypothesis, we divide the total sample into 2 sub–samples according to the production
technology (i.e. organic or conventional farming). By doing so, we consider only peers
who practice the same technology in the same group as learning reference.
15The first stage regressions can be found in Table C1 in Appendix C.
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Table 3: Social learning effect and efficiency in the total sample
Dependent variable: Technical efficiency Environmental efficiency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged peers’ efficiency 0.003∗∗∗ -.005 -.0005 0.006 0.114 1.072
(0.0008) (0.013) (0.0004) (0.023) (2.142) (1.006)
Lagged individual efficiency 0.978∗∗∗ 0.979∗∗∗ 0.994∗∗∗ 0.982∗∗∗ 0.975∗∗∗ -.367∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0009) (0.002) (0.006) (0.082) (0.063)
Age -5.30e-07 -2.00e-06 -.0001∗∗∗ -3.52e-06 0.00007 0.044
(1.31e-06) (1.55e-06) (0.00004) (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.03)
Sex -7.08e-06 0.00003 0.004 0.005
(0.00003) (0.0001) (0.003) (0.011)
Education 9.50e-06∗ 1.78e-06 0.0003 0.0004
(5.11e-06) (5.60e-06) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Rats -.0004∗∗ -.00002∗∗∗ 0.001 0.01∗∗∗
(0.0002) (6.15e-06) (0.004) (0.003)
Pests -.00007 -7.95e-
06∗∗
-.006∗∗ -.0002
(0.00006) (3.46e-06) (0.003) (0.002)
Group age -.00002 -.00004∗∗∗ 9.68e-06 0.0002 0.001 -.052∗∗
(1.00e-05) (1.00e-05) (0.00003) (0.0007) (0.015) (0.027)
Group sex -.0007∗∗∗ -.0007 0.0001 0.009 0.029 1.280∗∗
(0.0002) (0.001) (0.0006) (0.01) (0.157) (0.558)
Group education 0.00005∗∗∗ -1.00e-05 -2.79e-06 0.0005 0.001 0.001
(1.00e-05) (0.00002) (5.72e-06) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003)
Intercept 0.023∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.002 -.146
(0.0008) (0.008) (0.043) (2.220)
Group dummies x x
Individual fixed effect x x
Instrumentation x x x x
Observations 805 805 805 805 805 805
Number of plots 202 202 202 202 202 202
F statistic 2,837,094 2,807,083 3,499,681 3,319.524 1,854.209 23.57
R2 1 1 1 0.967 0.967 0.276
RMSE 0.0004 0.0005 0.00004 0.034 0.034 0.023
Hansen statistics 0.008 0.823 0.986 0.018
P-value Hansen statistics 0.928 0.364 0.321 0.893
Estimation method: OLS estimator in columns 1 and 4, 2LS estimator in columns 2 and 5, and within-2SLS in
columns 3 and 6. The dependent variable is the estimated technical efficiency in columns 1-3, and the calculated
environmental efficiency in columns 4-6. Seasons dummies are controlled for in all regressions, group fixed effects
are controlled for in columns 2 and 5, and plot fixed effects in columns 3 and 6. The variables sex, education are
time invariant and thus dropped in columns 3 and 6. *** statistical significance at 1%, ** statistical significance
at 5%, * statistical significance at 10%.
Table 4 reports results of the conventional farming sub–sample. The estimation results
are regrouped by measure of outcome, i.e. technical efficiency in columns 1 to 3, and
environmental efficiency in columns 4 to 6. For each measure, we run three regressions
(OLS, 2SLS and Within-2SLS) as in previous analysis16.
As indicated in Table 4, for farmers who practice conventional farming, their perfor-
mances in terms of technical and environmental efficiency, depend essentially on their own
experience rather than peers’ performance. This is not surprising as conventional farming
is practiced in the village since long time. Without effective organization and monitoring,
smallholder farmers have to handle the technology by themselves. Therefore, after a long
period of self-experimentation, conventional farmers have achieved stable performance on
basis of their particular conditions. Curiously, we note here female farmers have generally
16For more completeness, Tables C2 and C3 in Appendix C gives the first stage regressions for Tables
4 and 5 respectively.
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higher economic performance (i.e. technical efficiency) than male farmers at both individ-
ual and group level. This result suggests that organization of female group is an effective
way to foster farmers economic performance. This finding is interesting and important
for policy design in rural areas. We will compare this result with the results of organic
sub–sample.
Table 4: Social learning of conventional farming
Dependent variable: Technical efficiency Environmental efficiency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged peers’ efficiency 0.0007 0.011 -.0008 -.002 -.973 -.052
(0.002) (0.009) (0.0006) (0.087) (0.63) (0.264)
Lagged individual efficiency 0.978∗∗∗ 0.978∗∗∗ 0.993∗∗∗ 0.947∗∗∗ 0.925∗∗∗ -.425∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.012) (0.018) (0.078)
Age 4.11e-06∗∗ 5.07e-06∗∗ -8.62e-
05∗∗∗
0.00009 -.00002 0.004
(1.87e-06) (2.08e-06) (1.00e-05) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.008)
Sex 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.005
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.003) (0.003)
Education 7.24e-06 -1.03e-07 0.0008 0.001∗∗
(6.01e-06) (8.15e-06) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Rats -.00008∗ -.00007 -2.24e-
05∗∗∗
0.003 0.002 0.004
(0.00005) (0.00005) (8.23e-06) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Pests 0.00004 0.00003 -7.83e-06 -.011∗∗∗ -.009∗∗∗ -.004
(0.00003) (0.00004) (5.15e-06) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Group age 0.00008∗∗∗ 0.00009∗∗∗ -1.14e-06 0.002 0.00005 0.0008
(0.00002) (0.00002) (6.36e-06) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Group sex 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.008 0.014
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.00007) (0.014) (0.029) (0.034)
Group education 0.0001∗∗∗ 7.53e-06 -3.35e-06 0.005∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.003
(0.00003) (0.0001) (1.00e-05) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004)
Inverse Mills ratio 0.00006 0.00003 -7.70e-06 0.0007 0.003 -.010
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.017)
Intercept 0.016∗∗∗ 0.009 -.099 0.531
(0.002) (0.007) (0.08) (0.431)
Group dummies x x x x
Individual fixed effect x x
Instrumentation x x x x
Observations 510 510 476 510 510 476
Number of plots 158 158 124 158 158 124
F statistic 2,452,183 2,290,952 2,170,216 1,345.496 1,062.598 16.176
R2 1 1 1 0.971 0.969 0.328
RMSE 0.0004 0.0004 0.00004 0.033 0.033 0.021
Hansen statistics 0.699 0.975 0.536 0.227
P-value Hansen statistics 0.403 0.323 0.464 0.634
Estimation method: OLS estimator in columns 1 and 4, 2SLS in columns 2 and 5, and within-2SLS in columns
3 and 6. The dependent variable is the estimated technical efficiency in columns 1-3, and the calculated envi-
ronmental efficiency in columns 4-6. Seasons dummies are controlled for in all regressions, group fixed effects in
columns 2 and 5, and plot fixed effects in columns 3 and 6. The variables sex, education are time invariant and
thus dropped in all regressions. *** statistical significance at 1%, ** statistical significance at 5%, * statistical
significance at 10%.
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The same estimations (OLS, 2SLS and Within-2SLS) are applied to the organic sub–
sample and table 5 reports the results. For the case of organic farming which is organized
in the project framework, the results are more interesting. The effect of social learning is
positive for technical efficiency. The magnitude is small(i.e., 0.0001-0.0007) but significant
at 1%. The result suggests that for a new technology like organic farming, farmers learn
from their peers as well as their own experience. The well organized participatory social
learning is thus effective and efficient to foster smallholder farmers’ economic performance
of organic farming.
Table 5: Social learning of organic farming
Dependent variable: Technical efficiency Environmental efficiency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged peers’ efficiency 0.0006∗∗ 0.0007∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ -.0002 0.053 -.051
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.00005) (0.041) (0.036) (0.041)
Lagged individual efficiency 0.977∗∗∗ 0.977∗∗∗ 0.992∗∗∗ 0.981∗∗∗ 0.981∗∗∗ -.403∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.012) (0.11)
Age 9.35e-09 -1.77e-08 -8.17e-
05∗∗∗
-.0001 -.0001 0.009∗∗
(1.54e-06) (1.49e-06) (1.00e-05) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.004)
Sex -.0001∗∗ -.0001∗∗ 0.0001 6.63e-07
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.005) (0.004)
Education -7.22e-06 -7.38e-06 0.0007 0.0005
(7.82e-06) (7.61e-06) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Rats -.0004∗∗∗ -.0004∗∗∗ -.00002∗ 0.009∗ 0.008∗ 0.018∗∗
(0.00007) (0.00007) (9.66e-06) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
Pests -.00007 -.00007 -1e-05∗∗ 0.004 0.003 0.005∗∗
(0.00004) (0.00004) (4.60e-06) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Group age -2.09e-06 -2.76e-06 2.67e-07 -.001 -.002∗∗ -.001∗
(7.89e-06) (8.02e-06) (8.69e-07) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0006)
Group sex 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.00009∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.00004) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Group education -9.18e-06 -1.00e-05 -.00002∗∗ 0.012 0.01 0.003
(0.00008) (0.00008) (8.11e-06) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005)
Inverse Mills ratio 0.00008∗∗ 0.00008∗∗ 1.00e-05 0.008∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.00004) (0.00004) (8.69e-06) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Intercept 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.01 0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.024) (0.028)
Group dummies x x x x
Individual fixed effect x x
Instrumentation x x x x
Observations 295 295 277 295 295 277
Number of plots 97 97 79 97 97 79
F statistic 2,349,133 2,335,665 1,111,516 743.114 742.532 7.243
R2 1 1 1 0.966 0.966 0.341
RMSE 0.0003 0.0003 0.00004 0.036 0.035 0.022
Hansen statistics 0.007 0.174 0.118 1.342
P-value Hansen statistics 0.935 0.677 0.731 0.247
Estimation method: OLS estimator in columns 1 and 4, 2SLS in columns 2 and 5, and within-2SLS in columns
3 and 6. The dependent variable is the estimated technical efficiency in columns 1-3, and the calculated envi-
ronmental efficiency in columns 4-6. Seasons dummies are controlled for in all regressions, group fixed effects in
columns 2 and 5, and plot fixed effects in columns 3 and 6. The variables sex, education are time invariant and
thus dropped in all regressions. *** statistical significance at 1%, ** statistical significance at 5%, * statistical
significance at 10%.
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Nevertheless, the social learning effect is non-significant for environmental efficiency.
Put differently, smallholder farmers are economic rational rather than environmental pro-
tectionist. They learn to maximize the yield but not to minimize the use of environmen-
tally detrimental nitrogen, even in the case of organic farming. This result indicates the
critical limitation of social learning process in promoting resource conservative agricul-
ture. Without social learning, farmers will take long time to improve their environmental
efficiency based on their own experience and external incentives. Therefore, government’s
guidance and assistance become necessary in the urgent situation of environment deterio-
ration. In the case of Sancha village, more environmental education and extension service
should be provided to support smallholder farmers.
To check the effect of female groups, we find that the role of female groups is even
more important in the case of organic farming. Farmers in female groups have signifi-
cantly higher performances in terms of both technical efficiency and environmental effi-
ciency. This result is in line with our previous finding that women favor the adoption
of organic farming in Sancha village (Renard and Guo, 2013). This evidence has direct
policy implication for the human development in rural China. In a time where women are
becoming major labor force in agriculture (De Brauw et al., 2013), policy design should
be more favorable with respect to the education and organization of women in rural areas.
In any circumstance, women’s interests, specificity and ability should be well recognized
to promote a more performing and resource conserving agriculture.
7 Discussion and conclusion
As a prevalent form of agriculture, smallholder farming plays a crucial role in the sustain-
able agricultural development in developing countries. In order to empower smallholder
farmers for ecological innovation such as organic farming, initiatives of participatory social
learning are put forward and experienced within the framework of New Rural Reconstruc-
tion in China. The hypothesis is that smallholder farmers could learn from each other to
revive local knowledge and improve their performance. If it is true, farmers could rely on
themselves and reduce their dependance on external assistance for sustainable agricultural
development.
This paper aims to test this hypothesis with the experience in Sancha village from
southwest China. We estimate the social learning effect on smallholder farmers’ perfor-
mances in a Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) model. To disentangle the social learning effect
from environment related contamination effect and other individual related altruism ef-
fect, we make use of ecological shocks (i.e., rats and pests attacks) as instruments to run a
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IV-2SLS estimation and use technical efficiency and environmental efficiency as dependant
variables. To investigate the technological constraints for social learning, we separate the
sample by farmers’ technology (i.e., conventional and organic farming) and compare the
identification results.
In a step by step analysis, we demonstrate that social learning is conditional on the
same technology. Precisely, farmers mainly depend on their own experience in the case
of conventional farming. In the case of organic farming, the social learning effect is
significant. Farmers learn from their peers as well as their own experience. This result
suggests that for new technology such as organic farming, the organization of farmers for
participatory social learning is an effective and efficient way to adapt the technology to
local conditions and improve smallholder farmers’ performance.
However, social learning is not an excuse to withdraw the agricultural extension ser-
vice. We detect that smallholder farmers are economic rational rather than environment
protectionist. Given their poor economic condition, smallholder farmers are more inter-
ested by the improvement of technical efficiency rather than the environmental efficiency.
Without effective monitoring, the goal of environment protection will not be achieved
through a social learning process, even in the case of organic farming.
By recognizing the limitation of social learning, our policy recommendation stresses
the revival of agricultural extension system in rural areas. Provided the public finance
constraints, the extension system has almost collapsed in China (Huang et al., 2004; Jin
et al., 2009). In absence of agricultural extension service, farmers are driven by eco-
nomic interests and pursue the only objective of agricultural productivity. The serious
consequence has been illustrated by increasing use of chemical inputs and environmental
deterioration. Our study confirms once again the risk due to absence of effective agricul-
tural extension service. Even using a environmental friendly technology such as organic
farming, smallholder farmers’ economic incentives will never change.
Finally, we recommend more attention to women in the sustainable agricultural de-
velopment. As suggested by our study, female groups favor the smallholder performance,
especially in the case of organic farming. This is probably related to women’s advantage in
communication, sensibility and availability, which is favorable for sustainable agriculture.
Therefore, we should provide more opportunity and resource to educate and organize
women in the design of sustainable agricultural program. We believe that the human and
social capital in a feminized agriculture are the real assets for sustainable agricultural
development in China.
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Appendix A The calculation of the environmental ef-
ficiency
The logarithm of the output of a technically efficient producer Y Fi,t with Xi,t and Zi,t can
be obtained by setting Ui,t = 0 in Equation 6. However, the logarithm of the output of
an environmentally efficient producer Yi,t with Xi,t and Zi,t is obtained by replacing Zi,t
by ZFi,t, where Z
F
i,t = EEi,t ∗ Zi,t, and setting Ui,t = 0 in Equation 6 as follows
ln(Yi,t) = β0 +
3∑
j=1
βjln(Xij,t) + βzln(Z
F
i,t) +
1
2
3∑
j=1
3∑
k=1
βjkln(Xji,t)ln(Xki,t)
+
1
2
3∑
j=1
βjzln(Xji,t)ln(Z
F
i,t) +
1
2
βzzln(Z
F
i,t)
2 + Vi,t,
(10)
The logarithm of EE (lnEEi,t = lnZ
F
i,t − lnZi,t) can now be calculated by setting
Equations 6 and 10 equal as follows:
1
2
βzz(lnEEi,t)
2 + (lnEEi,t)[βz +
3∑
j=1
βjzlnXij,t + βzzlnZi,t] + Ui,t = 0, (11)
so,
lnEEi,t
=

−


A︷ ︸︸ ︷
βz +
3∑
j=1
βjzlnXij,t + βzzlnZi,t


±

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

B︷ ︸︸ ︷
βz +
3∑
j=1
βjzlnXij,t + βzzlnZi,t

− 2βzzUi,t


0.5
 /βzz
(12)
As mentioned by Reinhard et al. (1999), the output-oriented efficiency is estimated
econometrically whereas environmental efficiency (Eq. 11) is calculated from parameter
estimates (βz and βzz) and the estimated error component (Ui,t).
As we have mentioned, a technically efficient farm (Ui,t = 0) is necessarily environ-
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mentally efficient (lnEEi,t = 0). Thus, the “ +
√
′′ must be used17.
The final empirical model estimated in the translog case is:
Outputk,i,t = β0 + β1.Labork,i,t + β2.Capitalk,i,t + β3.Waterk,i,t + β4.Nk,i,t + β5.Labor
2
k,i,t + · · ·+
β9.Labork,i,t ∗ Capitalk,i,t + · · ·+
5∑
j=1
Seasons+
7∑
j=1
SEED − Uk,i,t + Vk,i,t,
(13)
which represents the relationship between the output and both traditional and envi-
ronmental inputs of plot k for farmer i and where Seasons is a dummy fixing each of the
five crop seasons and SEED is a dummy variable for the type of species of rice. The
output is the yield of raw rice harvested from the plot at end of the season. Traditional
inputs are (1) the labor defined as the number of hours spent in paddy rice production on
the plot weighted by the age of farmer (“hours/mu”), (2) capital defined as money spent
for the rice production on the plot including the machinery, employment and seed cost
(“yuan/mu”), and (3) water calculated from an index of water availability to the plot,
range from 1 (weak water availability) to 3 (good water availability). The environmental
input (N) is the use of pure nitrogen which is the most important nutrient input for paddy
rice production and also the biggest pollutant to underground water and air resulting from
agricultural production in China (see Table B1 for description and definition of variables).
Finally, the inefficiency term is allowed to be time–variant following the Battese–
Coelli parametrization of time-effects (Battese and Coelli, 1992). Therefore, the maximum
likelihood estimator is used to estimate TE, which is modeled as a truncated-normal
random variable multiplied by a specific function of time18.
17The sign in front of the term B should be necessarily positive. Thus, if Ui,t = 0, then lnEEi,t = 0.
18Estimations are made using Stata 11 and the command xtfrontier.
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Appendix B Definition of variables
Table B1: Definition of variables
Variable Name Definition and description
Organic Farmer’s self report organic status. It’s a binary variable
coded “1” if the plot is under organic management, “0” oth-
erwise.
Yield The quantity of raw rice harvested from the plot at end of
the season, the unit is “jin/mu”.
Labor Hours spent in paddy rice production on the plot. It is
weighted by the age of farmer. The unit is “hours/mu”.
N The external Nitrogen input from organic source or inor-
ganic source for the paddy rice production on the plot. The
unit is “jin/mu”.
Capital Money spent for the rice production on the plot including
the machinery, employment and seed cost. The unit is
“yuan/mu”.
Water Index of water availability to the plot, range from 1 to 3.
High index means good water availability.
Age The age of the household head (in years).
Sex The Sex of the household head: 1 = female.
Education Years of education of the household head.
Distance The geographical distance from farmer’s house to the plot.
Measured in minutes of walk. Range from 1 to 4.
Chemical pollution The presence of pollution from chemical fertilizer applica-
tion nearby the plot: With“1” yes and “0” no.
TE Technical efficiency calculated from the SFA model.
EE Environmental efficiency calculated using the method of
Reinhard et al. (1999).
Rats The damage caused by rats attacks. With “0” No damage,
“1” I level damage and “2” II level damage.
Pests The damage caused by pests attacks. With“0”No damage,
“1” I level damage and “2” II level damage.
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Appendix C First stage IV regressions
Table C1: First stage IV regressions in the all sample
Dependent variable: Lag peers’
Yield
Lag peers’ technical
efficiency
Lag peers’ environ-
mental efficiency
First stage reg. of Col.5-Table 2 Col.2-Table 3 Col.3-Table 3 Col.5-Table 3 Col.6-Table 3
Lag group rats (t-1) -33.963∗∗∗ 0.012 0.052∗ -.003 0.003∗∗
(8.502) (0.018) (0.03) (0.003) (0.001)
Lag group pests (t-
1)
6.618 0.0005 -.006 0.0004 0.003∗∗∗
(5.702) (0.013) (0.014) (0.002) (0.001)
Lag individual out-
come
0.024∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 2.040∗∗∗ -.038∗∗∗ -.009
(0.012) (0.02) (0.533) (0.002) (0.007)
Age -393.896∗∗∗ -.00004 -.017 -.0004∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(15.234) (0.0001) (0.013) (0.00009) (0.002)
Sex 0.01∗∗∗ -.005∗∗
(0.003) (0.002)
Education 0.0001 0.00003
(0.0005) (0.0001)
Rats 5.073∗ -.011∗∗∗ -.0002 0.001 -.0004
(2.961) (0.004) (0.003) (0.0009) (0.0004)
Pests 3.028 -.004∗ -.002 0.0008 -.001∗∗∗
(1.953) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0007) (0.0004)
Group age 344.269∗∗∗ 0.0005 0.005 -.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(13.796) (0.001) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002)
Group sex -2550.105∗∗∗ 0.087∗ -.867∗∗∗ -.072 -.371∗∗∗
(267.119) (0.048) (0.288) (0.051) (0.03)
Group education 0.477 -.001 -.003 0.004∗∗ 0.0004
(4.113) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.0008)
Intercept 4925.216∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.454 0.978∗∗∗ -.450∗∗∗
(264.132) (0.115) (0.294) (0.142) (0.027)
Observations 805 805 805 805 805
Number of plots 202 202 202 202 202
F statistic 904.286 53.961 31.663 4272.102 6506.258
R2 0.766 0.396 0.234 0.974 0.938
RMSE 25.096 0.038 0.024 0.011 0.004
Note: Robust standard errors. Seasons dummies are controlled for in all regressions, group fixed
effects are controlled for in columns 2 and 4, and plot fixed effects are controlled for in columns 1,
3 and 5. The variables sex, education are time invariant and thus dropped in all regressions. ***
statistical significance at 1%, ** statistical significance at 5%, * statistical significance at 10%.
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Table C2: First stage IV regressions and conventional farming
First stage regression of Col.2-Table 4 Col.3-Table 4 Col.5-Table 4 Col.6-Table 4
Lag group rats -.013∗∗ 0.011∗ -.009 0.027∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.01) (0.01)
Lag group pests -.006∗∗∗ -.009∗∗∗ -.009∗∗∗ -.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Lag individual outcome -.033∗∗∗ 0.087 -.036∗∗∗ -.082∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.15) (0.005) (0.022)
Age -.0001∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ -.0002∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.00004) (0.002) (0.00006) (0.002)
Sex -.001 -.003∗∗
(0.0008) (0.001)
Education 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Rats -.001 0.00006 -.002 -.00003
(0.0009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Pests 0.0009 -.001 0.001 -.002∗
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.001) (0.001)
Group age -.001∗∗∗ -.004∗∗∗ -.004∗∗∗ -.006∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.001)
Group sex -.030∗∗∗ -.038∗∗∗ -.040∗∗∗ -.058∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.012) (0.008) (0.019)
Group education 0.01∗∗∗ 0.001 0.014∗∗∗ -.005
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.002 -.004 0.004 -.008
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006)
Intercept 0.874∗∗∗ 0.007 0.734∗∗∗ -.920∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.054) (0.055) (0.064)
Observations 510 510 510 510
Number of plots 158 158 158 158
F statistic 726.302 196.986 1042.97 295.084
R2 0.967 0.741 0.968 0.831
RMSE 0.009 0.006 0.014 0.008
Note: The dependent variable is the lag of peers’ technical efficiency in columns 1 and 2,
and the lag of peers’ environmental efficiency in columns 3 and 4. Robust standard errors.
Seasons dummies and plot fixed effects are controlled for in all regressions. The variables
sex, education are time invariant and thus dropped in columns 2 and 4. *** statistical
significance at 1%, ** statistical significance at 5%, * statistical significance at 10%.
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Table C3: First stage IV regressions and organic farming
First stage regression of Col.2-Table 5 Col.3-Table 5 Col.5-Table 5 Col.6-Table 5
Lag group rats -.507∗∗∗ -.532∗∗∗ -.329∗∗∗ -.358∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.105) (0.031) (0.054)
Lag group pests -.016∗∗ -.021∗ -.034∗∗∗ -.049∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.011) (0.009) (0.016)
Lag individual outcome -.017 0.853 -.012 0.182∗
(0.018) (0.614) (0.013) (0.1)
Age -.00008 -.0008 -.00003 0.01∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.008) (0.0002) (0.004)
Sex -.003 -.006
(0.004) (0.005)
Education 0.0004 0.0005
(0.001) (0.001)
Rats 0.01∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.015
(0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01)
Pests 0.001 -.0002 0.003 -.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Group age 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.0002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Group sex -.026∗ -.054 -.038∗∗ -.047
(0.015) (0.07) (0.018) (0.045)
Group education 0.011 0.011 -.002 0.002
(0.016) (0.011) (0.022) (0.008)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.0005 0.012 0.004 0.018∗
(0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.01)
Intercept 0.834∗∗∗ 0.298 0.642∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.114) (0.19) (0.071) (0.161)
Observations 295 295 295 295
Number of plots 97 97 97 97
F statistic 4611.076 120.862 647.641 68.41
R2 0.936 0.803 0.881 0.689
RMSE 0.032 0.027 0.034 0.025
Note: The dependent variable is the lag of peers’ technical efficiency in columns 1 and 2,
and the lag of peers’ environmental efficiency in columns 3 and 4. Robust standard errors.
Seasons dummies and plot fixed effects are controlled for in all regressions. The variables
sex, education are time invariant and thus dropped in columns 2 and 4. *** statistical
significance at 1%, ** statistical significance at 5%, * statistical significance at 10%.
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